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This study investigates the gap between the climate change-related corporate governance 
information being disclosed by companies, and the information sought by stakeholders. To 
accomplish this objective we utilised previous research on stakeholder demand for 
information, and we conducted in-depth interviews with six corporate representatives from 
major Australian emission-intensive companies. Having gained and documented a rich insight 
into the potential factors responsible for the current gap in disclosure we find that the 
existence of an expectations gap; the perceived cost of providing commercially sensitive 
information; the limited accountability being accepted by the corporate managers; and, a lack 
of stakeholder pressure together contribute to the lack of disclosure. In highlighting the gap in 
disclosure, this study suggests strategies to reduce the gap in climate change-related 
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This paper is a part of a broader study consisting of three parts. The first part 
investigated the climate change-related corporate governance disclosure practices of 
five major Australian energy-intensive companies over a 16 years period (Haque and 
Deegan, 2010). In doing so, the paper developed a disclosure index consisting of 25 
specific climate change-related corporate governance issues under eight general 
categories. The index was developed on the basis of six expert guides provided by 
various research organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
respect of what elements should be included within a corporate governance system 
that properly addresses climate change. The paper argued that reports that provide 
information about the existence, or non-existence, of most of the 25 governance 
practices would provide useful (high quality) insights to report users whereas reports 
that provide little information would not be useful in assessing the companies’ 
response to climate change risks and opportunities. Looking at the disclosure levels 
the study concluded that although there was an increasing disclosure trend over the 
years, there was minimal reporting by major Australian companies in relation to 
climate change-related corporate governance practices. 
 
The results from the first part of the study (Haque and Deegan, 2010 as described 
above) lead to the following question: is this lack of climate change-related corporate 
governance disclosure a matter of concern? If nobody actually sought or used 
information about a company’s climate change-related corporate governance 
practices, then perhaps not (although from a sustainability perspective we might be 
concerned that people did not demand such information). With this issue in mind 
Haque, Deegan and Inglis (2010) investigated whether various groups in society 
demand climate change-related corporate governance information. They investigated 
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what types of information different groups of stakeholders believe that companies 
should disclose in relation to climate change-related corporate governance practices. 
Based on an online survey instrument the study asked a group of experts within 
different stakeholder groups (including institutional investors, government bodies, 
environmental NGOs, environmental consultancies, researchers, and accounting 
professionals) to rank the 25 specific climate change-related corporate governance 
disclosure issues developed in the previous research by Haque and Deegan (2010) 
in terms of their importance in assessing a company’s performance and risk 
exposure with respect to climate change. The results of their study highlighted that 
the expert respondents unanimously considered the issues in the index, developed in 
phase one of the research (that is, in Haque and Deegan, 2010), to be at least 
‘important’ in assessing organisations’ climate change-related corporate governance 
practises. The study also found six additional issues recommended by the 
respondents leading to a final index of 31 disclosure issues under eight general 
categories. Thus the second part of the study effectively utilised the disclosure index 
developed in phase one to build a ‘best practice disclosure index’ by using experts’ 
opinions. Appendix 1 presents the climate change-related corporate governance 
disclosure index developed by Haque, Deegan & Inglis (2010). The corporate 
governance disclosure index identified various items of information that stakeholders 
believe important in assessing the risks of an organisation in relation to climate 
change. The basis of the disclosures is that in assessing the future risks and 
opportunities that climate change poses to an organisation it is necessary to know 
the governance policies that have been put in place to address climate change. 
 
Taken together, the results of the previous two phases of the research project 
indicate that there appears to be differences between what companies are disclosing 
(supply) and what different groups of stakeholders are expecting companies to 
disclose (demand) in relation to climate change-related corporate governance 
practices. The experts within different stakeholder groups identified 31 specific 
climate change-related information items as important and expected companies to 
disclose such information (Haque, Deegan & Inglis, 2010). But the current climate 
change-related corporate governance disclosure practices suggest that current 
disclosure practices fail to meet the information needs of the stakeholders (Haque 
and Deegan, 2010). Other recent studies on companies’ climate change-related 
disclosure practices have also suggested that the current disclosure practice is 
typically deficient and not of a standard to satisfy the information needs of various 
stakeholder groups (Calvert and CERES, 2007; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2007; 
Friends of the Earth, 2006; GRI and KPMG, 2007; Kolk, Levy and Pinkse, 2008; The 
Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, UK, 2008). With this low level of disclosures, it would be very difficult 
for stakeholders to make an assessment of the potential climate change-related 
risks1 companies are facing (Haque and Deegan, 2010). 
 
The question examined in this current paper is why is there an apparent difference 
between the climate change-related corporate governance information provided by 
the companies and the information expected by the stakeholders? By interviewing 
senior executives of some Australian companies, this paper investigates the reasons 
for the difference between the climate change-related corporate governance 
                                                 
1
 Included within these risks were regulatory risks (e.g. regulation aimed at emissions trading; emissions 
reductions and increased energy efficiency; regulatory uncertainty and duplication; increased costs and 
growing compliance costs; mandatory greenhouse and energy reporting), physical risks (e.g. extreme 
weather events; rising sea levels and water shortages; infrastructure damage and associated costs; 
availability of water and other resources; increased insurance costs; business disruptions either directly 
or via the supply chain), and other risks (e.g. change in consumer attitudes and demand; damage to 
reputation; difficulty in attaining investment) (Labatt and White, 2007; Carbon Disclosure Project, 2008) . 
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information provided by the companies and the information that is sought by the 
stakeholders. 
 
This paper will progress as follows. In the next section we will consider the potential 
reasons for the low level of corporate disclosure (which in itself falls short of what 
stakeholders demand). In explaining why disclosures seem to be lower than 
stakeholders desire reference will be made to the notion of an expectations gap, the 
costs and benefits associated with reporting, the notion of accountability, and the 
concept of stakeholder power as outlined in social and environmental accounting 
literature. The paper will then describe the research methods employed before 
presenting the results of the study. The paper concludes by providing a discussion of 
the implications of the research. 
 
2. Possible explanations for the difference between the 
climate change-related corporate governance information 
provided by the companies and the information sought by 
stakeholders 
 
Comparing the previous two studies (Haque and Deegan, 2010 and Haque, Deegan 
& Inglis, 2010) we identified a gap between the supply of, and demand for, 
information with respect to climate change-related corporate governance practices. In 
this section we discuss the possible reasons for such a gap. While not all-inclusive, 
this will serve as a starting point for explaining the reasons for the low level of 
corporate disclosure relative to stakeholder demands. 
 
2.1 The notion of expectations gap 
 
Research into the existence of an expectations gap began in 1970s. Liggio (1974) 
first defined an expectations gap as ‘a factor of levels of expected performance as 
envisioned both by the independent accountant and by the user of financial 
statements’ (p. 27). Deegan and Rankin (1999) used the term ‘expectations gap’ to 
explain ‘the situation whereby a difference in expectations exists between a group 
with a certain expertise, and a group which relies upon that expertise’ (p. 316). Apart 
from the accounting literature, the notion of an expectations gap has also been used 
in other research areas, such as to explore the perceptions of the information 
systems industry in relation to the academic preparation of graduates (Trauth et al, 
1993), difference in expectations of advertising agencies and their clients in relation 
to campaign values (Murphy and Maynard, 1996), and variation in performance 
standards across demographic groups due to different proficiency standards (Reed, 
2009).  
 
Extant research in accounting literature regarding expectations gap falls into two 
categories: one being the audit expectations gap and the other being an expectations 
gap relating to financial statements (Higson, 2003). The audit expectations gap 
literature has investigated differing perceptions between auditors’ understanding of 
their function, and public expectations of the audit process (Porter, 1991; Humphrey 
et al, 1993; Monroe and Woodliff, 1993; Epstein and Geiger, 1994; Koh and Woo, 
2001; Dewing and Russell, 2002; Adams and Evans, 2004). Research concerning 
the existence of an audit expectations gap can be classified into three categories: 
differences in perceptions between auditors and financial statement users regarding 
what auditors’ should do (Lowe and Pany, 1993; Monroe and Woodliff, 1993; Porter, 
1993; Epstein and Geiger, 1994); differences in perceptions between auditors and 
financial statement users regarding what auditors’ are able to accomplish (Libby, 
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1979; Bailey, 1981; Nair and Rittenberg, 1987; Porter, 1993); and differences in the 
actual knowledge levels of both auditors and financial statement users regarding the 
audit situation (Hatherly et al, 1991; Porter, 1993). The objectives of these studies 
was to set out in more detail the auditors’ work and responsibilities, and thus help 
tackle the audit expectations gap (Higson, 2003). 
 
Previous studies investigating the expectations gap relating to financial statements 
described the difference between the expectations of users and preparers of financial 
reports (AAA, 1990; Accountancy, 1993: 1; ASCPA and ICAA, 1994; Deegan and 
Rankin, 1999; the Financial Reporting Commission, 1992: 53; Liggio, 1974; Stacy, 
1987: 94; Independent Audit Limited, 2006). For example, ASCPA and ICAA (1994) 
considered the term expectations gap to describe the difference between the 
expectations of financial report users and the accounting profession with respect to 
the perceived quality of financial reporting and auditing services. Another report 
provided by Independent Audit Limited and the ACCA found that there is a 
substantial expectations gap between the financial information provided by 
companies and the information sought by users and interested parties (Independent 
Audit Limited, 2006). 
 
However, compared to the recognition given to the financial statement expectations 
gap, the possibility of a non-financial statements expectations gap has almost been 
ignored. A notable exception was the research undertaken by Deegan and Rankin 
(1999) who found the existence of an expectations gap between the users and 
preparers of annual reports in relation to corporate environmental information. They 
observed that an expectation gap existed between the users and preparers of annual 
reports where users perceived environmental information to be more important 
relative to the preparers’ perspective of its importance to report users’ decision 
making processes. Deegan and Rankin (1999) argued that an expectations gap is 
considered to exist when there is a difference between the expectations users have 
in relation to corporate environmental information and the expectations preparers 
believe users have in regard to that information. 
 
Consistent with the notion of an expectations gap, and for the purposes of the focus 
of this paper, there may be a gap between the expectations stakeholders have with 
regard to the importance of climate change-related corporate governance information 
and the expectations companies believe stakeholders have in relation to that 
information. 
Although stakeholders identified a growing demand for climate change-related 
corporate governance disclosures, corporate managers might be unaware of the 
demand. Thus, perhaps it is not clear to preparers what is expected by the 
stakeholders in relation to climate change-related corporate governance information. 
The existence of an expectations gap might explain, at least in part, why the demand 




2.2 Cost-benefit analysis 
In the absence of any regulatory requirements in relation to climate change-related 
corporate governance disclosure practices it is important to understand the 
managerial motivations for reporting or hiding information. Deegan and Rankin 
(1999) argued that an important consideration in the companies’ ‘decision to disclose 
environmental information within the annual report is the cost of gathering and 
presenting such information, when compared to the perceived benefits of doing so’ 
(p. 320). Corporate environmental information tends to be provided free of charge to 
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the users of such information, with companies bearing the full cost of disclosure 
(Solomon, 2000; Solomon, 2010). The insights from previous studies on cost-benefit 
analysis indicated that information costs influence the levels of corporate disclosure 
(Chandra and Greenball, 1977; Gray and Roberts, 1989; Entwistle, 1997). Gray et al 
(1990, p. 617) found that voluntary disclosures depend largely upon the ‘outcome of 
an assessment of the economic consequences of the proposed’ disclosure items. 
Adams (2002) argued that companies’ perceptions about the benefits of reporting 
influence the extent and nature of corporate social reporting. Thus, the decision to 
provide information to the users would depend on determining the costs and benefits 
associated with such reporting. 
 
There is currently no nationally consistent approach or regulatory requirement for 
reporting of climate change-related corporate governance information in Australia. 
Higher levels of climate change-related data integrity and accuracy increase the 
reporting costs for individual entities (Department of Climate Change, 2009). There 
might be also a commercial impact of potential energy consumption and production 
which suggests a cost associated with disclosure of energy emissions that 
subsequently leads to commercial disadvantage (EPA Victoria, 2006). A high level of 
data accuracy is also required. 
 
Other costs could include the possibility that various stakeholders will use information 
provided by the company to take actions, including legal actions, against the 
company due to the perceived shortcomings in its environmental performance 
(Deegan and Rankin, 1999). There might also be some potential reputation cost from 
negative press such as costs associated with countering any negative publicity as a 
result of disclosure (EPA Victoria, 2006). 
 
The benefits to business of disclosing climate change-related information may 
include an improvement in the management of the organisation’s processes, and 
GREATER regulatory certainty (Deegan and Rankin, 1999; EPA Victoria, 2006). In 
addition, providing information helps to build credibility and trust within the 
community, along with increased investor support for the companies i.e. boosting 
‘good reputation’ among investors ((EPA Victoria, 2006; Solomon, 2010). 
 
Comparing the perceived costs and benefits associated with reporting is an important 
exercise for company managers. Therefore, deciding not to disclose particular 
information might be deemed better for the value of the company. In our current 
research context, perhaps cost-benefit assessments associated with reporting 
determines companies’ decisions about what climate change-related corporate 
governance information should be disclosed, or not disclosed. 
 
 
2.3 The notion of Accountability 
The cost-benefit rationale discussed in the previous section has come from the 
positive accounting theory perspective (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Cormier and 
Magnan, 1999; Hope, 2003) where managers are portrayed as rational actors who 
calculate the net benefits of voluntary disclosure in order to decide whether to report 
or not. This idea of assessing costs and benefits of disclosure is counter to the notion 
of accountability which emphasises ‘the duty to provide an account or reckoning of 
those actions for which one is held responsible’ (Gray, Owen, and Adams, 1996, p. 
38). Gray, Owen and Maunders (1991) applied the notion of accountability to 
corporate social reporting and argue that the role of corporate social reporting is to 
inform society about the extent to which the organisation meets the responsibilities 
imposed upon it. The notion of accountability explains that provision of voluntary 
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reporting has net benefits in that stakeholders’ information needs are met and 
accountability requirements are discharged. Corporate social reporting is therefore, 
assumed to be responsibility-driven rather than demand or survival-driven which 
implies that people in society have a right to be informed about certain aspects of an 
organisation’s operations (Deegan, 2009).  
 
Deegan (2009) suggests that the rights to information grounded in an accountability 
perspective as outlined by Gray et al. (1991; 1996) is consistent with the normative 
branch of stakeholder theory2. Based on ethical principles, normative stakeholder 
theory focuses on how managers should act. This approach provides the moral basis 
for stakeholder theory by stating, “Do (Don’t do) this because it is the right (wrong) 
thing to do” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p.72). Normative stakeholder theory 
investigates whether managers should meet the demands of the stakeholders other 
than shareholders and, if so, on what grounds these various stakeholders have 
justifiable claims over the firm (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). It attempts to lay the 
ethical foundation for the suggestion that an organisation has an obligation to 
recognise the demands of all appropriate stakeholders. 
 
Given that management is ultimately responsible for their companies’ contribution to 
global climate change, and therefore implicitly accountable for implementing climate 
change-related corporate governance practices, the accountability perspective would 
argue that companies should account for their actions or inactions in some form of 
report provided to the stakeholders. However, the current climate change-related 
corporate governance reporting practices made by Australian companies offers little 
evidence to demonstrate such a normative duty towards stakeholders. Therefore, 
perhaps one reason for the relatively low level of disclosure is that managers 
consider they have limited accountability in relation to the governance policies they 
have in place to address climate change. 
 
2.4 Stakeholder power 
While the normative branch of stakeholder theory (on which the notion of 
‘accountability’ is based) emphasises that all stakeholders have the right to be 
treated fairly by an organisation, it does not consider issues of stakeholder power 
(Deegan, 2009). A counter view is that organisations will respond to the expectations 
of those stakeholders with the most power over the organisation (Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006; Deegan, 2009). These stakeholder groups control resources 
necessary to the organisation’s operations and would withdraw support from the 
organisation if important social responsibilities were unattended (Freeman, 1984; 
Ulmann, 1985; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). This notion comes from the 
managerial branch of stakeholder theory which predicts that management is more 
likely to focus on meeting the expectations of powerful stakeholders, who have the 
greatest potential to influence organisations’ ability to generate maximum financial 
returns. 
 
The power of a particular stakeholder to influence corporate management depends 
on the extent the stakeholder has control over the resources required by the 
organisation (Ullman, 1985). Mitchell et al (1997) maintain that stakeholders can be 
identified based on three criteria: power, urgency, and legitimacy. According to their 
theory, the level of stakeholder salience is determined by how many of the criteria the 
                                                 
2
 Deegan (2002) suggests that stakeholder theory has an ethical (normative) and a managerial 
(positive) branch. While the ethical branch provides theoretical prescriptions about who an 
organisation’s stakeholder ought to be and how they should be treated, the managerial branch 
(stakeholder management) is more concerned with managing the stakeholders. 
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stakeholders meet. Should a stakeholder have a legitimate claim on the organisation, 
but lack power and urgency3, Mitchell et al argue that it would have little salience in 
the eyes of management. Of the three criteria, a stakeholder’s power to affect the 
organisation is prioritised. The organisation may affect stakeholders but it will 
consider the effects of its actions on stakeholders mainly if the stakeholders can in 
turn influence their operations. Therefore, organisations will respond to those 
stakeholders who are considered as powerful (Buhr, 2002; Baily et al, 2000). A 
successful organisation is therefore, considered to be one that satisfies the needs of 
the various powerful stakeholder groups (Islam and Deegan, 2008). If managers 
perceive particular stakeholders to be both powerful and to be demanding 
information about the policies and procedures that the company has in place to 
address climate change then it would disclose information to conform to such 
demands. 
 
Another related theoretical perspective, overlapping with stakeholder theory, is 
institutional theory which posits that organisational structures and practices are 
shaped by pressures from stakeholders who expect to see particular practices in 
place. According to Scott (1987, p. 498) ‘Organizations conform [to institutional 
pressures for change] because they are rewarded for doing so through increased 
legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities’. Institutional theory has been used to 
explain why there is often a degree of correspondence between the institutional 
practices used within different organisations. According to DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), the greater the dependence of an organisation on another organisation, the 
more similar it will become to that organisation in structure, climate, and behavioural 
focus. Such a process is referred to as coercive isomorphism4. 
 
Coercive isomorphism is closely associated with the managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory (Deegan, 2009). It is more related to the concept of power, as it 
arises where organisations change their institutional practices because of pressure 
from those stakeholders upon which organisations are dependent (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). The company is therefore coerced by its powerful stakeholders into 
adopting particular voluntary reporting practices. The apparent adoption of such 
practices is deemed to provide an organisation with a level of legitimacy that would 
not otherwise be available if it was to deviate from ‘accepted’ organisational forms or 
policies (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
From the above discussion it is argued that what is important is the power that a 
stakeholder has over the organisation and its objectives. How much power the 
stakeholder can exert will reflect the extent to which the organisation relies on the 
stakeholder, and the extent the stakeholder can disrupt and cause uncertainty in 
organisations operations. Meeting the powerful stakeholders’ expectations will help 
ensure them the scarce and essential resources necessary to the achievement of the 
objectives. Therefore, how organisations operate and report will be influenced and 
shaped by the powerful stakeholders’ expectations for particular practices, including 
disclosure practices (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Gray et al. 1995; Deegan, 2009). 
                                                 
3
 Urgency is the extent to which stakeholder efforts call for immediate attention by a firm (Mitchell et al, 
1997). 
4
 The other two categories of isomorphism are normative isomorphism and mimetic isomorphism that 
provides limited insight to understand the direct pressures of powerful stakeholder groups and how such 
pressures directly influence organisational practices including disclosure related practices. Further, it is 
difficult to identify that one form of isomorphism, above the others, is the driver for the adoption of 
particular organisational structures. As Carpenter and Feroz (2001, p. 573) state, ‘two or more 
isomorphic pressures may be operating simultaneously making it nearly impossible to determine which 




However, in our current research context, the disclosure levels of the companies are 
not consistent with the expectations of the stakeholders in relation to climate change-
related corporate governance practices. This suggests that meeting the information 
needs of the stakeholder groups are not the primary objectives of report preparers. 
Managers tend to identify relevant stakeholders as being those who are able to exert 
the most influence over the company’s operations (Owen, Shaw and Cooper, 2005; 
Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). Therefore, it is argued that the difference between the 
information provided by the companies and the information sought by the 
stakeholders is perhaps because stakeholders’ power is not perceived to be great 
enough to motivate the companies to report (or those with power do not want the 
information). 
 
To sum up this section, we have provided a number of potential reasons why 
stakeholder demand for information is not being satisfied. These reasons were linked 
to an expectations gap, the cost-benefit rationale, the notion of accountability, and 
the concept of stakeholder power. We attempt to consider these potential 
explanations as far as possible by interviewing corporate managers across a number 
of companies. The following section describes the research method employed. 
 
3. Research Method 
The aim of this study is to investigate why there is a difference between the climate 
change-related corporate governance information provided by the companies and the 
information expected by the stakeholders. To achieve this objective, this study 
provides qualitative data from in-depth interviews about the perceptions of corporate 
managers. Interview questions were open-ended and were primarily derived from the 
research objective. The discussion in the literature review section above provides 
possible explanations about why such a difference might exist. It should be noted 
that these possible reasons were used only as a guide for our interviews to remain 
flexible so as to allow for other possible factors that might emerge from the interview 





Because of the access and time considerations associated with the collection of 
interview data, the number of companies and participants chosen from each 
company was limited. We selected participants from the companies identified in the 
first phase of the broader study which investigated climate change-related corporate 
governance disclosure practices. These companies were BHP Billiton 
(manufacturing/mining), Caltex (oil refinery), Origin Energy (oil, Gas, Electricity), Rio 
Tinto (manufacturing/mining), and Santos Limited (oil and gas). As indicated in the 
first study, the selection of the companies was based on the criteria that the company 
would be in an industry that would be likely to be highly exposed to risks and 
opportunities associated with climate change, and be listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX)5. We also know that these selected companies were 
shown to provide fairly low levels of disclosure (Haque and Deegan, 2010). 
 
                                                 
5
 In a report by Citigroup researchers claims that among the Australian Stock exchange (ASX) top-100 
listed companies those who are most at risk from the impact of climate change are involved in 
emissions-intensive industries such as Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, Caltex Limited, Santos Limited and those 
who will gain from climate change include alternative energy such as Origin Energy (Rolph and Prior, 
2006). 
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To identify relevant managers able to comment on the climate change-related 
corporate governance policies and related reporting practices, we conducted an 
analysis of the websites of the selected companies. The details of these interviewees 
appear in Appendix 3. The positions of the interviewees indicate their expertise and 
competency to evaluate the respective company’s climate change-related corporate 
governance practices and related disclosure practices. Confidentiality was assured 
and the interviewees are referred in this paper by a coded number, the order of which 
does not necessarily reflect the order in which they appear in the Appendix. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
Six in-depth interviews with the representatives of the selected companies were 
undertaken over a two month period from September 2010 to October 20106. 
Unfortunately it was not possible to interview a representative from Caltex7. Whilst 
our sample size is relatively small we believe that the views provided by the 
managers of the sample companies (all of which are very large organisations with 
major exposure to risk and opportunities associated with climate change) 
nevertheless provides valuable insights into climate change-related reporting 
practices. 
 
Those who were invited to participate in interview received an email invitation, 
explaining the purposes and nature of the research study, along with a sample 
interview guide so that participants might be familiar with the issues to be explored. 
The interviews ranged between 40 to 60 minutes. While we utilised an interview 
guide, interview questions were open-ended. Before each interview we explained our 
project to each interviewee. The interviews took place at a time and location of the 
participant’s choosing, with four of the six interviews conducted by telephone. All 
interviews were tape-recorded with the consent of interviewees and were 
subsequently transcribed almost verbatim. Transcriptions were carefully scrutinised 
against the tape recordings and amendments made where necessary. 
 
After transcription, the coding of the interview data was performed. The main issues 
around which the coding took place were the managerial motivations to disclose or 
not to disclose information. In order to provide information about what the 
interviewees have said we have elected to provide detailed replication of quotes 
which allows readers to consider not only the potential explanation the researcher 
has suggested, but also alternative explanations (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992). As 
indicated by Deegan and Blomquist (2006, p. 355), the reproduction of a number of 
direct quotes helps ‘guard, at least to some extent, against the authors providing their 
own, potentially biased, perspective of what interviewees were saying’. The quotes 
we have replicated were those quotes that represent the typical view of the 
interviewees. Details of any view provided by an interviewee that is in contrast to the 
other participants are provided. 
 
4. Interview responses 
Our research objective was to investigate the reasons for the difference between the 
information provided by the companies, and the information sought by the 
stakeholders in relation to climate change-related corporate governance practices. 
To accomplish this research objective, we talked to six corporate representatives to 
                                                 
6
 The companies were BHP Billiton, Origin Energy, Santos Limited, and Rio Tinto. Both BHP Billiton and 
Rio Tinto are divided into a number of international businesses differentiated by product type. For this 
study interviews have been taken place with BHP Billiton Groups and BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Coal 
Alliance, and Rio Tinto Coal Australia and Rio Tinto Alcan. 
7
 Various attempts to reach corporate representative from Caltex Limited were made including reminder 
e-mails and few telephone calls. 
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understand managerial motivations to disclose or not to disclose information. Thus, 
the main issues that we were particularly interested in investigating included— 
1. Motivations for the companies to disclose climate change-related corporate 
governance information 
2. Motivations for the companies not to disclose climate change-related corporate 
governance information 
 
4.1 Motivations for disclosing climate change-related 
corporate governance information 
To investigate why companies do not disclose information, it would be useful to 
understand first what actually motivates them to disclose information. Our participant 
companies were identified in the first phase of the broader study that investigated 
current climate change-related corporate governance disclosure practices of some 
Australian companies through their annual and sustainability reports. In that study 
Haque and Deegan (2010) found that there is an increasing trend in companies’ 
climate change-related corporate governance disclosure practices over the years. In 
relation to the changing nature of the disclosure practices, the interviewees were 
therefore asked to identify the rationale for developing climate change-related 
corporate governance practices and related disclosure practices. Respondents 
unanimously indicated that their reporting practices were motivated by stakeholders’ 
interest for climate change-related corporate governance information. Reflective of 
the change in perceived expectation of the stakeholders, it was stated that— 
 
…certainly interests from stakeholders. If you get back in early 2000s, you know back 
then when I started we did not receive many investors’ surveys. We did not receive that 
many questions from the community. Employees were not even interested. But certainly 
the last ten years have seen an increase in stakeholders’ interest, not just about what our 
carbon emissions are, but what governance policies we use internally to manage climate 
change. So there is a lot more interest from the stakeholders about how we are managing 
our climate change liabilities and those sorts of things. (Interviewee #5) 
 
I think we are seeing an increase in requests from the stakeholders for disclosure about 
how much GHG we emit, how would we reduce the carbon intensity of our product, and 
how we manage our GHG emissions. I think what you have probably found in our annual 
and sustainability reports is that the change in reporting is derived by the increasing 
request for information about our performances and targets. (Interviewee #4) 
 
The above quotes emphasise managers’ perceptions about the changing 
expectations of stakeholder groups for information. The quotes also reveal a 
perceived change in stakeholder’s interest that has moved from information about 
general carbon emissions to information about how companies manage climate 
change via their governance policies. Corporate representatives were then asked to 
identify the stakeholder groups who want information from the respective companies. 
Responses included: 
 
There are many interested stakeholders. I suppose the obvious one to come to mind is 
government who has an interest in how we run our business through regulations. Our 
community is obviously another significant stakeholder. All the community around our 
operations are very interested in everything we do around climate change. Employees 
are another group interested to know what we are doing, broadly around sustainability not 
just climate change. (Interviewee #1) 
 
There are interests from various stakeholders for information. For example, investors who 
are looking at companies to see how well they are managing this climate change issue. 
And there is also interest from external groups like NGOs. NGOs are following 
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companies’ statements and performance on reducing GHG emissions and monitoring 
whether companies are doing a good job or not or need to do more. (Interviewee #3) 
 
We have four stakeholders. Number one is our shareholders. Number two is our 
customers. Number three is the community that we operate in, and number four is our 
employees. Then there are NGOs. I probably would say that our reporting is mostly 
aimed at our community and our shareholders. Our company has a responsibility to show 
how we respond and how we deal with climate change (Interviewee# 4) 
 
The above quotes suggest that government, investors, NGOs, customers, 
employees, and the community in general were among the stakeholder groups who 
are perceived as wanting information. Companies’ reporting practices were aimed at 
the information needs of these stakeholder groups. The responses of the corporate 
representatives also indicate companies are being strategic in nature when 
responding to stakeholders’ interest for information with a motivating factor being 
competitive advantage: 
 
There are interests from stakeholders for information, most recently, from the managers 
of the ethical investment funds. We believe that responding to them can eventually create 
a competitive advantage in the context of a future carbon-constrained environment. Our 
company is doing what is necessary to accurately collect information on our emissions in 
a comprehensive way. And then reporting this information is an important part of the 
company equipping itself to stay competitive in the future carbon constrained world. 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
Again, the strategic nature of the companies’ disclosure policies is emphasised to 
gain benefits, and reporting is considered as a strategic policy that for the 
companies:  
 
What I sort of look at it is that for the energy industry, as it goes through transition from 
very carbon intensive to low carbon, climate change will add value to the companies that 
are smart enough to adapt with it. That is why we are moving towards renewable sources 
of energy as a transition which plays very much into our strategic positioning. Reporting is 
one such area that would add value to our company. We think that there is value in there 
for our customer brand. We can differentiate ourselves a little more from our competitors 
by reporting more information which indicates that we are trying to do the right thing to 
our environment, to the community and to our customers’ life. (Interviewee #4) 
 
In summarising companies’ motivations for reporting climate change-related 
corporate governance information, it appears that there were interests from 
stakeholder groups for more information and this had acted as a motivating factor 
behind companies changing their reporting practices. Disclosing information also is 
perceived to provide them competitive advantage over their business counterparts. 
Stakeholder groups identified by our participants included government, investors, 
NGOs, customers, employees, and community in general. However, question 
remains whether companies were fully aware of the expectations of these 
stakeholders in relation to various issues associated with climate change-related 
corporate disclosure practices. Later in the paper we report whether these 
stakeholder groups were perceived to be powerful enough to drive companies’ 
disclosure practices. 
 
At this stage of the interviews we advised our participants about the survey 
conducted in Haque, Deegan and Inglis (2010) that investigated different groups of 
stakeholders’ perceptions about what companies should disclose in relation to 
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climate changerelated corporate governance practices8. In that survey study Haque, 
Deegan and Inglis developed a disclosure index, comprising 31 specific climate 
change-related corporate governance items of information (see Appendix 1), based 
on the expectations of a group of stakeholders including government bodies, 
institutional investors, environmental NGOs, and consumer associations – all of 
which were among the stakeholder groups perceived as having an interest in climate 
changerelated information. We provided the interviewees with the index containing 
the list of information items considered as important by the stakeholders in assessing 
an organisation’s climate change-related corporate governance practises. Our 
intention was to find out what the respective company representatives perceived 
about the expectations stakeholders had regarding climate change-related corporate 
governance information. The respondents were advised that despite the expectations 
of the stakeholders, much of the information was found missing in the respective 
companies’ annual and sustainability reports (that is, within their company’s own 
reports). The responses of the corporate representatives are provided below. 
 
Four out of six respondents indicated that there is some information that they 
specifically elect not to disclose. For example: 
 
I am not trying to say we answer every question that everyone wants to know. I am sure 
there are some gaps. But I believe any gaps are not that significant. (Interviewee #3) 
 
I know there is some information missing. But it does not mean that we will not consider it 
in the process. (Interviewee #4) 
 
Consistent with the current research context, it does appear that despite the 
expectations of the stakeholders, companies are not disclosing all the climate 
change-related corporate governance information sought by stakeholders. 
 
4.2 Motivations for not disclosing climate change-related 
corporate governance information 
 
Existence of an expectations gap 
Building upon the responses of the corporate representatives that there is a gap in 
current climate change-related corporate governance disclosure practices, they were 
asked to explain why some information is not being disclosed. A typical response to 
this question was that respondents believed that stakeholders were not interested in 
so much information. 
 
I don’t think that people are interested so much in the absolute number of what we are 
reporting. People mean government, our employees, local communities which we operate 
in—are interested in, as a significant emitter whether we are improving our performance, 
and how we are improving our performance. Then they might be looking at what else we 
would be doing to try to improve our climate change-related corporate performance. So, 
                                                 
8
 Solomon and Lewis (2002) argued that the user groups may consist of two sub-groups, namely a 
normative (environmental consultants, academics, professional organisations, trade and industry 
associations and government 
organisations) and an interested party group (environmental pressure groups, independent financial 
advisors, fund managers, researchers, political and professional bodies, banks, institutional investors 
and the media), where the normative party ‘may not actually use CED, they are likely to have strong 
views about what is required by users’; on the other hand, the interested party group ‘is intended to 
represent the users themselves’ (p. 160). Similarly, the stakeholder groups (accounting professionals, 
environmental NGOs, environmental consultancies, government bodies, institutional investors, 
researchers, consumer associations, and media) in Haque, Deegan and Inglis (2010) were considered 
as users of climate change-related corporate governance information as well as having expertise in 
relation to what is required by the users. 
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we always report on our performance which I believe is enough to satisfy stakeholders’ 
interests. (Interviewee #1) 
 
Look, the information need [of the stakeholders] should also be realistic. Some of them 
[information items], I believe, are neither important nor what our stakeholders are really 
interested in. If we try to deal with all the information then we will probably overload 
people with information. Certainly that’s not what we want. (Interviewee #5) 
 
Three of the six respondents emphasised that their level of disclosure is greater than 
what most people expect them to disclose. 
 
The level of reporting that we provide is much greater level than what most people are 
interested in. I can’t see that there would be a lot of issues people would want to know. 
Most people don’t want to know all the specific climate change-related corporate 
governance issues you mentioned. Rather I guess they are more interested in broader 
climate change issues. (Interviewee# 2) 
 
In relation to the above responses, respondents were asked to explain why they 
believed that stakeholders are not interested in some information. One respondent 
argued that if stakeholders were interested to know certain information, those issues 
must have been raised by them during companies’ engagement with stakeholders. 
 
I think our people and investors’ relation team would get feedback of what they are 
expecting and what we are not doing. Thus, we continually assess whether or not we are 
meeting expectations. If there is certain information that they want us to disclose but we 
are not disclosing then clearly they will let us know. As we are not getting any such 
feedback I am not sure whether they are really interested to know so many things. With 
government we assess whether we are not meeting their expectations, mostly through 
compliance. So we have interaction with them. In terms of our community and 
employees, I think certainly our sustainability development reports meet their needs. We 
do talk with community to assess how to meet their needs, what they see that we are not 
seeing, and then we negotiate that back in. (Interviewee #2) 
 
This above statement suggests that although there is a demand for information by 
the stakeholders (Haque, Deegan and Inglis, 2010), the information are not 
perceived as being raised with the companies. There is insufficient response from 
stakeholders which also implies a lack of pressure being exercised by stakeholder 
groups. This point is further discussed subsequently within the section ‘lack of 
stakeholder power’. 
 
Deegan and Rankin (1999) found that an environmental reporting expectations gap 
arises when the users considered environmental information as more important for 
their decisions than is perceived by the preparers. Likewise, our respondents argued 
that stakeholders are not interested as they believed that not all information is 
important for users’ decision making. A typical response was: 
 
I don’t think all this information is necessarily important for stakeholders’ decision making. 
For example, regarding separate board committee, we thought about it. But at the same 
time thought what a separate board is going to do? Because carbon emissions are 
intrinsically linked to the whole operations. I would particularly argue that you need some 
kind of board where some of the difficult decisions are getting the right feasibility that 
would drive your organisation forward. Ifyou look at an organisation like us, carbon is 
such an important business driver for us, both on the opportunities and the risks that it is 
an inherent part of what we do and the decisions we make and the way we think. So it is 
like for us business as usual. So that’s why we do not have a separate board to look at 
these decisions. It is sort of part of our normal business. (Interviewee #4) 
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At the same time three respondents emphasised the less importance of annual and 
sustainability reports as means of communication, as well as the importance of 
keeping annual and sustainability reports as short and concise as possible. 
 
There are many ways of providing such information. Annual reports etc are the lowest 
means of communication when it comes to meeting information needs. When we have a 
specific information requirement from the stakeholders, we try to meet that request in the 
most efficient and effective way possible. So you know if you only look at one element of 
our communication, annual reports are pretty blunt instrument really. And we do not seek 
to make our sustainability reports a fully comprehensive document that would meet the 
need of every potential stakeholder, because it would be 1000 pages and therefore it 
would be less useful because there would be too much information. (Interviewee #1) 
 
For some of the information, particularly within the annual and sustainability reports, we 
always get the battle to try to keep them as short and concise as possible. We have been 
going through award processes and certainly try to look at how our sustainability report 
ranks against others. And the general feedback we are always getting is that the shorter 
the better. So sometimes it’s not possible to include all information in annual or 
sustainability reports. (Interviewee #5) 
 
One of our aims in this research was to provide evidence to determine whether an 
expectations gap exists between stakeholders (users) and company managers 
(preparers) in relation to climate change-related corporate governance information in 
annual and sustainability reports. The results provided in this study indicate that such 
a gap does appear to exist. From the above responses it appears that corporate 
representatives believed that stakeholders were not interested in all the issues 
associated with climate change-related corporate governance practices. 
Respondents tended to disagree with a view that all the climate change-related 
corporate governance information items were important for users’ decision making. 
Respondents also tended to downplay the importance of annual and sustainability 
reports as a means of communication that are considered as important to the users. 
Based on the notion of expectations gap, it was posited that an expectations gap 
exists when there is a gap between the expectations stakeholders have and the 
expectations companies believe stakeholders have in relation to the importance of 
various issues associated with climate change-related corporate governance 
practices. In considering the answers provided by the corporate representatives, it 
does appear that the notion of an ‘expectations gap’ is able to offer an explanation of 
the current gap in disclosure. 
 
 
Cost-benefit consideration vs. notion of accountability 
With respect to the question ‘why some information is not being disclosed’, it 
emerged from the responses that companies did not believe that stakeholders were 
particularly interested in a broad range of issues. Respondents were then asked to 
explain whether they would disclose information if they were aware that stakeholders 
wanted to know additional information about climate change-related corporate 
governance processes. In response to this question there was an overwhelming 
consensus among the respondents about some information being commercially 
sensitive, therefore meaning it was not viable for them to disclose such information. 
Responses indicated that managers a constraint on disclosure would be the extent to 
which the information is deemed commercially sensitive. As indicated by one 
respondent: 
 
We understand that there is a need on behalf of our stakeholders to disclose that 
information [items in the index]. We have lots of stakeholders all around the world. So you 
know our reporting is obviously in response to the needs of our stakeholders. The reason 
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you report is because you believe that your stakeholders should know certain information. 
But again, there is always going to be an example of certain information a stakeholder 
group wants to know that we elect not to report. There is some information which is in 
confidence for commercial reasons, therefore it can not be shared publicly. So I suppose 
my response does not sound surprising. There are individual pieces of data that we do 
not report or have not reported that people would like to see. People would always want 
us to report everything. Clearly we cannot. (Interviewee #1) 
 
This is supported by another respondent— 
 
There is certain information that we can not disclose. There is some commercially 
sensitive information that does not project the company in the best possible way. If it is 
one such area then we would not disclose that information. Otherwise we certainly will 
never try to hide information. And sometimes we would be breaking ASX disclosure rules. 
(Interviewee #5) 
 
The above responses suggests that even though managers are aware of the 
information needs of stakeholders, they would not disclose information if it is deemed 
commercially sensitive. Thus the concern over disclosing sensitive information 
seems to dominate the notion of expectations gap as a reason for non-disclosure. 
Corporate representatives also indicated a shareholder-oriented view by focusing on 
the commercial return of the companies. As stated by one respondent: 
 
We have to balance commercial sensitivity. The company can only report what is in the 
best interest of the shareholders and we have commercial information that needs to be 
protected. Commercial profit is one aspect which is often forgotten when people ask for 
information. If stakeholders have all the information [in the index], and if they approach us 
with those needs, we would consider to respond accordingly and on most occasions, if it’s 
not commercially sensitive, then we simply provide this information. Transparency within 
the bound of commercial sensitivity is something that we value. (Interviewee #1) 
 
Shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, want us to make commercially 
sensible decisions. You know we are not a philanthropic institution. A lot of decisions that 
we take are based on the business case. So when we make a decision to disclose 
information we have to make sure that shareholders interest are not compromised. We 
cannot disclose information that might have a negative impact on our commercial return. 
Disclosure of confidential and commercially sensitive information may not be necessarily 
beneficial for the shareholders. (Interviewee 4) 
 
The above statements emphasise that the managers’ decision to disclose or not to 
disclose information is based on ‘economic’ rationales rather than on the basis of a 
duty of accountability towards a wider stakeholder audience. However, demands for 
transparency often relate to social and environmental matters as opposed to 
commercial issues (Crane and Matten, 2007). Avoiding the revelation of 
commercially sensitive information might protect the interests of the shareholders, 
but it is very difficult to envisage stakeholder accountability being established in a 
situation where managers have such a preoccupation with maximising shareholder 
value (Cooper and Owen, 2007). 
 
When asked what kind of information they considered as confidential, the typical 
responses were: 
 
In the index you mentioned that stakeholders want us to disclose the potential financial 
implications of any climate change policy affecting the organisation. But we do not 
disclose this information for competitive reasons. We have discussed about this in our 
internal system and then decided not to disclose. We cannot disclose for example very 
specific information about the energy consumption by our specific operations because 
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that might be valuable to our competitor, how we are doing certain operations, how much 
energy it takes. So because of our competitive concern we cannot necessarily release 
information. (Interviewee #3) 
 
I think that sometimes declaring certain information can get you into trouble because 
people can take that data and go do things with it. It might also be misinterpreted. 
Information about energy consumption and production can be particularly sensitive. 
(Interviewee# 2) 
 
We might be doing some stuff that we do not want to talk about. This might relate to some 
strategic programs that we might develop in next few years. We do many things such as, 
electric vehicles, energy system management, fuel cells and that sort of thing. We 
probably don’t want to put them in reports if we think that it would bring us competitive 
disadvantage. We don’t want our competitors to know that we are doing this. There is 
also a risk of influencing the market value of the company [disclosing sensitive 
information publicly]. (Interviewee# 4) 
 
The answers provided by the corporate representatives reveal that there is a cost 
associated with disclosing information around financial implications of climate change 
policies, energy consumption and production, and strategic policies that 
subsequently leads to competitive disadvantage. The quotes also display that 
companies’ fear misrepresentation of information (Solomon and Lewis, 2002). 
 
Regarding the cost of disclosures, one respondent indicated that there are some data 
collection and distribution costs associated with reporting. However, the respondent 
argued that this is not that material as it is a part of their ‘business as usual’ 
approach:  
 
There are costs associated with reporting, for example, data collection and distribution 
costs. But would it be a significant cost in relation to all of our other costs? No, it would 
not be. Is it significant cost compared to the cost we pay for energy? No it is not. Clearly 
it’s a small proportion of our energy costs each year. However, there are some significant 
costs. As you know, it takes quite a lot of work and involves a lot of time and people 
within the organisation to make sure the information is appropriate and correct. But this 
cost would not be material, as well as it is  certainly not insignificant. (Interviewee# 1) 
 
Responses from the corporate representatives also indicated that because many of 
the benefits of reporting are internal (e.g. better data, identification of opportunities 
for improvement, boosting employee morale), and because these benefits are difficult 
to quantify (e.g. builds credibility and transparency within the community, and other 
stakeholders including shareholders), companies tend to underestimate their 
importance. 
 
In this paper we argued that the cost-benefit assessments associated with reporting 
determines companies’ decision to disclose information. The interview responses 
indicated that the most important cost limiting disclosure is competitive disadvantage 
(Gray et al, 1990), not the direct costs of disclosure which includes the costs of data 
collection, and dissemination. The most important consideration that influence 
companies disclosure practices was the competitive disadvantage in relation to 
disclosing commercially sensitive information. From the views expressed here, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the companies’ interviewed did not feel ethically 
obliged to report certain information. Their positions imply that economic motive play 
a dominant role compared to embracing a broader level of accountability. Thus they 
are discharging limited accountability by not providing as fuller account as they could 
of their climate change-related corporate governance practices. The cost of reporting 
commercially sensitive information appears to dominate the notion of expectations 
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gap, as corporate representatives clearly stated that even though the stakeholders 
ask them for information, they would not disclose it if the information being requested 
is commercially sensitive. So the next question is whether the stakeholders’ power is 
perceived to be great enough to motivate companies to disclose information, 
including commercially sensitive information. 
 
Lack of stakeholder power 
Based on the complementary perspectives within the managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory and coercive isomorphism of institutional theory, it was argued 
that if the power of the stakeholder groups who want information is not perceived to 
be great enough then companies would not be motivated to disclose climate change-
related corporate governance information. Therefore, the interviews held with the 
representatives of the companies sought to discover whether the pressure from the 
powerful stakeholder groups was great enough to drive companies’ climate change-
related corporate governance disclosure practices. 
 
As identified earlier from the responses of the corporate representatives, there are 
several stakeholder groups who want information in relation to climate change-
related corporate governance practices. The stakeholder groups identified by the 
respondents include investors, government, employees, NGOs, customers, and the 
community in general. Corporate respondents were, therefore, asked whether they 
perceived these stakeholder groups as powerful regarding their reporting issues. In 
response to this question, respondents argued that different stakeholders are 
powerful in different ways. Among them investors and government were considered 
as the most powerful stakeholders. 
 
It’s hard to narrow down that one is more important than the others. There are all different 
and they have slightly different interests in what we are reporting. Certainly investors are 
one of the most important stakeholders. What is really important is that investors can 
understand that we are managing climate change adequately so that they will not feel 
unsafe with their investment (Interviewee #5) 
 
If investors want to know any information we have to provide them that because we need 
funds from them. We need to demonstrate that we can manage our emissions and 
reduce our emissions as much as possible from the projects that they are investing in. 
We need to demonstrate that the projects are safe, so they are not going to lose their 
money. Otherwise they do not want to invest in our businesses. ((Interviewee #3) 
 
The above responses indicated investors, as a fund provider, are the stakeholder 
considered as powerful. It indicates that if investors, as a supplier of resources, 
require companies to provide particular climate change-related corporate governance 
information then companies would provide this information to secure funding. But 
commercially sensitivity would still act as a barrier to reporting. Interview responses 
also suggested that investors are not perceived to be particularly interested in 
improving climate change-related practices of companies. Rather, they are more 
interested in the profitability aspect. 
 
I think investors are certainly powerful stakeholders as they provide funds. If there is any 
specific query we are happy to provide that information. However in case of commercially 
sensitive information we cannot even disclose to our investors. I guess investors also 
understand that. They do not usually require any information that would be not be in the 
best interest of the company or the investors. I think they are more interested in 
commercial profitability of the business rather than social responsibility types of things. 
They are more concerned about the business risks we face from climate change, whether 




We try to make sure that we consider the concerns of environmental NGOs, our 
employees, our customers, the community in general who are more interested in our 
climate change-related performances, as well as the concerns of our investors, who are 
more interested in our commercial return. So sometimes there might be some conflicts 
between which concerns you should prioritise. (Interviewee #4) 
 
It was revealed by the respondents that there were a number of disclosure 
frameworks being used, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) project. As 
indicated by one respondent: 
 
We are providing information to our investors, particularly through the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP). I think 2006 is the first year that Australian companies were invited to 
participate in CDP. We also report in other surveys that are more general in nature but 
have a climate change component in them. For example, we are participating in the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI). But the CDP project is more comprehensive with 
respect to climate change and it appears to have created a deal of interest with investors. 
(Interviewee #5) 
 
The CDP has led to the institutionalisation of carbon reporting given that the majority 
of the 500 largest global companies are now using the CDP as a mechanism for 
carbon disclosure (Kolk et al, 2008). Kolk et al argued that the increasing response 
rate to the CDP suggests that investors’ pressure can have an impact on carbon 
reporting. However when asked whether they perceived any pressure to participate 
in the CDP, or any other similar reporting practices, one of the five respondents 
explained: 
 
Rather than pressure it is probably useful in identifying our gaps and for focussing 
improvement. Particularly the CDP helps us to identify the gaps that we have. And the 
DJSI as well. (Interviewee #5) 
 
What we have found from the responses was that although investors are powerful, 
they are perceived to be more interested in the profitability aspect of the business – 
that is, whether their return on investment is going to be affected. This concern for 
profitability versus concerns for environmental responsibility (Oliver, 1991) has an 
influence on corporations’ business practices, including reporting practices. . 
 
Another powerful stakeholder group with regards to reporting is government because 
of legal compliance. If it is a particular government requirement, then companies feel 
a need for compliance. Responses included: 
 
Governments are obviously a very important stakeholder. All kinds of governments 
including state, federal and even local. If you have a legal obligation then government 
have power to make you report. If government wants any information we provide them 
that. (Interviewee #2) 
 
However, the following response suggests that at present companies do not perceive 
a great deal of pressure from the government because of the lack of current 
regulatory requirements. 
 
[Not exactly] I don’t see it [government] as providing much pressure. We have constant 
engagement with the government and it is more like an ongoing discussion around policy 
development, around mechanics of reporting in relation to climate change. I don’t think 
we feel any pressure. Government sometimes asks information like ‘do you have 
information on the emissions impact of your solar project, or do you have actual 
information around that’. But there is not that much pressure on the way we report. Our 
climate change-related reporting in annual and sustainability reports is totally voluntary. 
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There is no legal obligation for us to report on our climate change-related governance 
practices. But there might be government pressure brought upon us. We are now covered 
by National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS). So that’s the kind of 
reporting standard we are moving into. (Interviewee #4) 
 
While companies do not perceive pressure from the government right now, there is a 
consensus about future regulatory environment in relation to climate change-related 
business practices. Respondents suggested that government regulation would be the 
biggest influence in future period for their climate change-related business practices: 
 
I think given where government policies are heading there is potential for the government 
policies to have a big impact on businesses. Now we are operating in a more voluntary 
environment. And it will change as we move to a more regulated environment [such as 
price on carbon, taxes, and international trading on carbon]. (Interviewee #4) 
 
Cowan and Deegan (2010) argued that although it is likely that the implementation of 
regulations like the NGER Act 2007 and the proposed CPRS may increase voluntary 
emissions disclosure in annual reports and other media, it is similarly likely that such 
disclosures will continue to be incomplete and inconsistent. When asked how 
respondents perceived that the future regulatory environment might affect company’s 
reporting practices, and the following perception emerged (which was reflective of the 
argument made by Cowan and Deegan, 2010): 
 
I do not believe that our voluntary reporting practices would be changed much because of 
government regulation. We are already disclosing our emissions publicly, and doing 
compliance reporting as well. (Interviewee #5) 
 
Other stakeholder groups considered as powerful included the ‘community’ in 
general, employees, customers, and NGOs. The following comment is reflective of 
this view: 
 
Community is the one group who can stop us going ahead and expanded into new 
projects through the licence to grow, or license to operate. We also focus on employee 
engagement. Employees have certainly been taking a lot of interest in what we are doing. 
We have engagement programs to share our ideas, to make sure employees know what 
they are doing. Customers are probably the one we listen to more because at the end of 
the day they pay for everything. So we make sure to do what makes them happy. And 
that’s probably where we focus more and more to meet the customer needs. So I think 
they are all powerful but in different ways. We are in retail, so we are very close to the 
customers …and then there are NGO groups that are interested. We have received a lot 
of queries from environmental NGOs, especially when government policy got released. 
There is always a request for more information from NGOs for our strategic positioning 
towards climate change. But it’s hard to say one is really more important than the other. 
(Interviewee #4) 
 
From the above responses by the corporate representatives, it appears that 
companies perceived that the community is a powerful stakeholder because without 
communities’ approval they cannot gain a ‘community license to operate’. Other 
powerful stakeholder groups are employees and customers who are interested in 
organisations’ climate change-related business practices. NGOs are another 
interested group. However when asked whether they feel any pressure from the 
groups they considered as powerful to disclose climate change-related corporate 
governance information, most of the interviewees indicated that they do not feel any 
pressure from the respective stakeholders. Typical responses included: 
 
No, we don’t feel any real pressure. I don’t think their influence is great. I don’t think we 
set up our sustainability reports or other reports towards our stakeholders because they 
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are powerful. I think we report in a way that all of our stakeholders can read it and find it 
useful. There haven’t been any NGOs or any consumer groups or communities coming to 
us and complaining that we are not doing enough in terms of climate change policies and 
reporting. We have no pressure from our stakeholders that we need to do more on 
climate change. And that’s because we are very strong on our advocacy position and we 
are investing in cleaner technology etc. (Interviewee #4) 
 
I will not necessarily say we feel pressure. We have never received any complaint that we 
are not working enough on climate change. But we do feel that they value information. 
There is value in us providing information. So I would say it’s more like a case of 
understanding that we can have better relations with our stakeholders and they will have 
a better view of our company if we make information available. (Interviewee #3) 
 
Because of the concerns of others we never reported. We have given them the data and 
we believe that it is enough for them to make decisions. And we will continue to do that. 
We have been reporting voluntarily to the greenhouse challenge program for nearly 13 
years now. So once you are into the culture of public disclosure I don’t think there is any 
issue that we don’t disclose. I would say in terms of our stakeholders such as 
environmental NGOs, or consumer groups, I am not aware that many of them actively 
seek out further information about our performance. So I wouldn’t say that we have got 
environmental NGOs coming to see us and say there is particular information they would 
like to know. We have already reported or are reporting everything necessary. And its not 
that we feel any pressure for this public disclosure. I think we are transparent on what we 
report. (Interviewee #2) 
 
In considering the various answers provided by the corporate representatives it 
appears that the lack of stakeholder influence over companies’ disclosure practices 
offers an explanation of the current gap in disclosure. Stakeholder power stresses 
the power of stakeholders in influencing corporate practices. Prior literature found 
that because of the pressure from the powerful stakeholder groups such as investors, 
NGOs, and community in general, there was a change in companies reporting of 
some specific aspects of social and environmental performance (Deegan and 
Blomquist, 2006; Epstein and Freedman, 1994; Tilt, 1994). Thus the influence of the 
powerful stakeholder groups can bring change to organisation’s corporate practices. 
However, although considered as powerful, our corporate respondents had not 
perceived any great deal of pressure from the key stakeholders such as government, 
investors, NGOs, and the community in general in relation to climate change-related 
corporate governance information. Chang and Deegan (2010) found that because of 
a lack of pressure from the powerful stakeholder such as the government, 
environmental management accounting (EMA) would be less likely to be embraced 
by universities for the purpose of managing environmental costs and minimising 
environmental impacts. In this study, the interview responses indicated that powerful 
stakeholders have not been perceived to exercise pressure on companies to 
motivate them to disclose climate change-related corporate governance information. 
Although there is a demand for information from powerful groups, the level of 
pressure is not up to the level that drives companies to disclose more information. 
Due to a lack of exercise of stakeholder power, it is less likely that companies would 
be motivated to disclose the information sought by the stakeholders. Therefore, the 
lack of pressure from the powerful stakeholder groups contributes to explain the lack 
of climate change-related corporate governance information provided by Australian 
companies. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper explores potential reasons for an apparent gap between the climate 
change-related corporate governance information being provided by companies, and 
the information being sought by stakeholders. Having now gained and documented 
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insights into the various factors responsible for the current gap in disclosure it is 
argued that the existence of an expectations gap; the perceived costs of providing 
certain information; the limited perceptions of accountability held by the companies; 
and, a lack of stakeholder pressure together appear to contribute to the apparent lack 
of climate change-related corporate governance disclosures within the Australian 
context. 
 
The results of our research identified the potential existence of an expectations gap 
with corporate representatives not being aware of the information sought by 
corporate stakeholders. Corporate managers believed that stakeholders were not 
interested in a great deal of information pertaining to the governance policies in place 
that addressed climate change-related issues. Corporate representatives also 
indicated that managers would be disclosing information if they were aware that 
stakeholders required it unless such information was deemed ‘commercially 
sensitive’. 
 
There was particular concern about disclosing commercially sensitive information 
relating to climate change-related strategies and policies. Indeed, perceptions of 
commercial sensitivity appeared to be one of the major constraining factors 
pertaining to reporting. In considering the likely costs associated with disclosing 
information (due to its commercial sensitivity) corporate managers appeared to be 
advancing the interests of shareholders over and above the interests of other 
stakeholder groups (who arguably have a right-to-know about an organisation’s 
climate change-related governance structures). For stakeholder accountability to be 
established, a less ‘economic’ focus needs to be embraced by the companies. 
 
The interview data also reveals that due to a lack of perceived stakeholder power 
requiring disclosure, companies are not motivated to disclose a great deal of climate 
change-related corporate governance information. That is, stakeholders were not 
perceived as likely to economically ‘hurt’ organisations if particular climate change-
related information was not disclosed. Therefore, if particular stakeholders do want 
such information then it may be incumbent upon them to clearly indicate to the 
company that a failure to disclose climate change related information could result in 
economic sanctions being imposed (for example, removal of important supply 
agreements). In this regard we can consider the case of Nike. In the 1990s Nike 
refused to disclose the identity and location of their suppliers because of perceptions 
about it being commercially sensitive information that could be exploited by their 
competitors (Crane and Matten, 2007). Yet, concerns from the stakeholder groups 
over working conditions in these factories ultimately led economic pressure being 
exerted on Nike to disclose information, which in 2005, it ultimately agreed to do 
(Crane and Matten, 2007). 
 
In this study the interview findings show that there is a lack of pressure from 
stakeholder groups such as government, and investors, NGOs, ethical investments 
funds and so forth to drive companies to disclose more information. The present 
study suggests that actions from the powerful stakeholder groups are needed to put 
pressure on Australian companies to disclose information, including commercially 
sensitive information. 
 
At present there is a lack of industry and regulatory initiatives in place to reduce the 
expectations gap in relation to climate change-related corporate governance 
disclosures. New legislation and standards for disclosure of climate change-related 
corporate governance practices may be able to narrow the apparent disclosure gap 
and over-ride non-reporting decisions associated with issues of commercial 
disadvantage. The idea behind mandatory disclosure is that ‘if all companies are 
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disclosing there can be no competitive advantage by non-disclosure’ (Solomon and 
Lewis, 2002, p. 166). 
 
Our research also suggests that there is a potential need for more stakeholder-
company engagement to ensure that company managers are aware of issues of 
importance to the stakeholders, as well as to assist users in determining what 
information is reasonable to expect given the pressures and constraints under which 
corporations operate (Deegan and Rankin, 1999). 
 
The reasons for non-disclosure that have been identified in this study should assist 
both report prepares and users. Companies would be able to focus on areas where 
stakeholders’ disclosure expectations are perceived as not being met, specifically in 
the area of strategic planning around carbon emissions and production. In 
highlighting the gap in disclosure, this study would provide further impetus for 
strategies to increase the extent and quality of climate change-related corporate 
governance disclosures. It would assist report users by providing more clarity with 
respect to their needs for information. This research should also assist accounting 
regulators and legislators in developing reporting requirements that satisfy 
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1) An organisation has a board committee with explicit oversight 
responsibility for environmental affairs.  
2) An organisation has a specific board committee for climate change 
and greenhouse gas (GHG) affairs.  
3) The Board conducts periodic reviews of climate change performance. 
BOARD 
OVERSIGHT 
4) The board should understand and disclose the potential financial 
implications of any climate change policy affecting the organisation. 
5) The Chairman/CEO articulates the organisation’s views on the issue 
of climate change through publicly available documents such as annual 
reports, sustainability reports, and websites. 
6) An organisation has an executive risk management team, dealing 
specifically with GHG issues.  
7) Some senior executives have specific responsibility for relationships 
with government, the media and the community with a specific focus on 
climate change issues. 
8) An organisation has a performance assessment tool to identify 







9) The executive officers’ and/or senior managers’ compensation is/is 
not linked to attainment of environmental goals. 
 28 
10) The executive officers’ and/or senior managers’ compensation is 
linked to attainment of GHG targets. 
11) An organisation conducts an annual inventory of total direct/indirect 
GHG emissions from operations. 
12) An organisation calculates GHG emissions savings and offsets from 
it’s projects  
13) An organisation has set an emissions baseline year by which to 
estimate future GHG emissions trends. 
14) An organisation sets absolute GHG emission reduction targets for 
facilities and products. 
15) An organisation has third party verification processes for GHG 
emissions data. 
16) An organisation has a specific policy to purchase and/or develop 
renewable energy sources.  
17) An organisation has specific requirements for suppliers to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with their operations.  
18) An organisation has a policy of providing product information 





19. An organisation has an accredited labelling standard for providing 
information about the environmental impacts of the products. 
20) An organisation has a specific policy to develop energy efficiency by 
utilising/acquiring low-emission technologies.  
RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT  
21) An organisation has a policy of investment to accelerate the 
research and development of low-emissions technologies and support 
energy efficient projects. 
22) An organisation pursues strategies to minimise exposure to 





23. An organisation pursues strategies to minimise the possibility of 
litigation being brought against for its impact on climate change. 
24) An organisation has specific frameworks to benchmark its 
greenhouse gas emissions against other companies and competitors.  
25. An organisation employs its industry benchmarking standards (if 
any)  of reducing GHG emissions. 
REPORTING/ 
BENCHMARKING 
26) An organisation has a policy of compliance with Global Reporting 
Initiatives (GRI) Guidelines or a comparable Triple Bottom Line format 
(e.g. GHG Protocol) to report its greenhouse gas emissions and trends.  
27) An organisation has a policy for trading in regional and/or 
international emission trading schemes. 
CARBON PRICING 
AND TRADING 
28) An organisation has a policy to assist government and other 
stakeholders on the design of effective climate change policies such as 
carbon pricing and/or National Emission Trading Scheme. 
29) An organisation has a public policy to support collaborative 
solutions (e.g. work with the government and other organisations in 
voluntary emission reduction projects) for climate change.  
30) An organisation has a policy to promote climate friendly behavior 
within the community by raising awareness through environmental 
sustainability education.   
EXTERNAL 
AFFAIRS 
31) An organisation should disclose information about its climate 





Appendix 2: Interview guide 
1. What are the policies the company has taken in the corporate governance 
practices in response to climate change? For example does the company discuss 
climate change at the board level? Please describe. 
 
2. As I have found in your company’s annual reports, your reporting practices in 
relation to climate change-related governance practices has changed over the years. 
For example, in annual reports some new information can be found that were absent 
before, such as: 
 
Could you please explain what brings about these changes? 
 
3. Could you please identify the stakeholder group who wants to know such 
information?  
 
5. How often there is engagement with the stakeholders when these reporting needs 
are considered and in what ways? Please provide details. 
 
6. What are the key climate change issues raised by the stakeholders (if at all)? Does 
your company respond to all the climate change issues raised by stakeholders?  
 
7. I conducted a survey on different stakeholder groups such as institutional 
investors, environmental NGOs, government bodies, and found that they want to 
know many climate change-related governance information such as… As I have 
found in company’s annual reports, and as you mentioned about your governance 
practices, some of these information are missing …what is your opinion about this? 
Could you please explain why this information is not being disclosed? 
 
9. Does the power of a stakeholder have any impact on you decision to report 
information? Who do you consider as a powerful stakeholder regarding this reporting 
issue and why?  
 
10. Does the company feel any pressure to account for its impact on climate change? 
Who imposes the pressure? How does the company react to the pressure and what 
are the actions taken? 
 
 
11. What is your opinion about the benefits associated with the reporting of climate 
change-related information, especially climate change-related governance 
information? Do you think reporting of information brings any benefit for the 
company? What are the major benefits included in reporting? Please describe.  
 
12. What is your opinion about the costs associated with reporting (preparing and 
presenting the information)? What are the major costs included in reporting? Please 
describe. 
 
13. Does the perceived cost-benefit of reporting have any impact on your decision to 
report information?  
 
14.  What factors do you think will be the biggest influences on climate change-
related issues, especially reporting issue, in the next five years and why? How do 




Appendix 3: List of interviewees 
Company Position 
Rio Tinto Coal Australia Manager, Climate Change, External 
Relations 
Rio Tinto Alcan Manager, Climate & External Policy 
 
BHP Billiton Group 
 
Group Manager, Climate Change and 
Energy 
 
BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Coal Alliance Manager, Climate Change 
 
Origin Energy Head of Innovation, Retail, Origin 
Carbon 
 
Santos Limited Climate Change Analyst, Climate 
Change & Sustainability 
 
Note: as indicated within the text, to maintain anonymity interviewee labels 1-5 within 
the text do not necessarily apply in the order in which the interviewees appear in the 
appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
